GREEK PHILOSOPHY - II.
"First Philosophy," or Metaphysics
We come now to Aristotle's theory of Being
(τό όν) which at the very outset we shall find to be
in close agreement with his
theory of knowledge. Being is fixed or changeable. That there is fixed being
appears from a consideration of the doctrines of Heraclitus and Protagoras. If all
things are in a continual flux, we have to say that a thing is and is not the
same at the same moment and in the same regard. If we say that contradictory
propositions are equally true, we practically affirm that all propositions and
terms mean the same thing, and may affirm, for example, that a man is a wall.
And if being is not in any regard fixed and definite, what becomes of
affirmation, and demonstration, and rational action?(1) Being is, then, in one
aspect fixed, and in this aspect it is being per se (τό
όν ή όν), being in the highest sense ; it is being
that answers to scientific knowledge, and is known by us last in order
of time, though (and because) first in the order of nature. Now
the science of being per se, being as being (τό
όν ή όν) Aristotle
deems to be the highest part of philosophy and terms it "First Philosophy"
It is what we, following the example of the early
editors of Aristotle's works, term metaphysics. "First Philosophy," then, does
not treat, as does mathematics, for example, of some phase or department of being, but
of being taken universally, or as such. And just as the "science of
health" treats of the preservation, the production, the symptoms or signs of it,
and the capacity for it, so the science of
being treats of whatever has reference to it, whatever is
primarily or derivatively being.
Being; Plato's ''Ideas"
But what is being, i.e., under which of the categories
must we conceive it? Evidently under that which is highest and first, which
denotes not anything that can be predicated, but is itself the subject of all
predicates. Being, in other words, is substance, ούσία
; and in the highest sense
it is individual in nature, since primary substance is the individual(2). Being,
or substance, therefore, is not identical with those "universals" which Plato held
to be being. Plato's theory of Ideas is untenable ; because, if the Ideas are
transcendent and perfectly independent of the world of individual phenomenal
existences, they are not in any explicable manner causes of the existence, or of
the character of things, or of our knowledge of them. If substance is primarily
individual, the substances of things must be in and with things themselves, and
it is only on the hypothesis that they are, that we can conceive them as having
anything to do with the existence or changes in things or can attain a knowledge
of them by the process of induction. Universal notions are indeed necessary for
demonstration's sake, but demonstration does not necessarily presuppose the
existence of the Platonic universals, because it is necessary, and sufficient,
for scientific knowledge, if there be a One in or among the many instead of
being separate from and in addition to the many. The supposed participation of
things in Ideas is therefore a mere fancy, to be allowed only in metaphorical
speech; and the Ideas, if
there were such things, would be only idle copies of the things of the sensible
world or mere barren entities, of which nothing could be known or said(3).
Matter and Form; Potentiality and Actuality
Every finite substance is the
result of the becoming actual of that which already was in possibility. As it
actually is for us, it is a definite cognizable being; as
only possible, it was, relatively at last, indefinite, incognizable. That by virtue of which it is definite and
cognizable—relatively or absolutely—is termed its
form. As it existed in possibility, it was but matter. As its actual being is
but the realization of its being in possibility, every substance contains, or
is the union, in some manner, of matter and form. The stone out of which the
statue is made is in possibility a statue—is "matter" for a statue. When form
(i.e., a particular character) is given to it there results the actuality,
the statue, which is the union of a certain matter and a certain form, and is an
individual substance. Matter (ϋλη) and form (μορφή), it must be observed,
are, like possibility, or potentiality
(δύναμις), and actuality (ένέργεια),
generally speaking, correlative terms, because it is the same thing
which in one aspect is form and in another matter. Not every possibility
becomes actuality, and there is one form which is pure form (God). In the union
of matter and form there are, in different substances, different degrees of
preponderance of form over matter. Those substances that have stability,
universality, or, at least, generality, as a characteristic, owe this to the
largeness of the element of form in
them, contingency in things being due to the influence of matter(4). A thing is in
a state of imperfection as long as it is in the process of becoming; it attains
perfection, or is an entelechy (έντελέχεια),
only as actuality(5). In this respect, then, actuality is "prior" to potentiality. But it is also "prior"
in another respect: we know the potentiality only (as we reason by the principle
of analogy) from the actuality. The actual is partly prior in time to the
potential, partly not. The child is prior to the man, and yet the existence of
the child presupposes the existence of a man prior to that of the child. The
actual is prior to the potential because the actual is that which is what it
is, whereas the potential may or may not be, is therefore not self-identical,
Causes, or First Principles (άρχαί)
If, now, we inquire why matter assumes
form, why the possible becomes actual, the answer is, that "there must be an
efficient cause imparting motion from potentiality into actuality". Every
substance, therefore, involves in its existence and nature, matter, form, and
efficient power(7). These three are consequently principles, or causes. To them
must be added a fourth, the end (τέλος), or final cause; for every thing that
becomes, not only is "produced from something, by something, and is something,"
but has an end. These four causes—to take an illustrative example—would
be, in the case of a house, as follows : The end, τέλος , or final cause,
ού ένεκα, is
comfort and protection; the matter, ΰλη, or material cause, is earth and
stones ; the form, or formal cause, τό τί ήν εϊναι, is the mental pattern or idea in the builder's mind
according to which it is made; the efficient cause, όθεν ή άρχή τής μεταβολής, is the builder and his art(8). But the four causes are not always so
widely distinct as here. The child is the end of a certain process of which
the material, formal, and efficient causes are in the parent(9). Again, the end and
the process may be the same ; the end of sight is the act of seeing, of
speculation, speculation(10). In these two cases there is also a certain degree of
identity between the formal and the final cause, on the one hand, and the
efficient cause, on the other ; i.e., seeing and speculation are "inherent" in
him who sees and him who speculates. Speaking generally, since the final cause
of a thing is only its form, or ideal nature, plus existence, the formal cause
and the final cause may, without logical inconsistency, often or, perhaps,
generally, be regarded as one, viz., the formal cause, τό τί ήν εϊναι.
Again, in beings that have souls
the efficient cause is in a manner identical with the formal and
final cause. Thus the name formal cause often implies more than
its definition really contains. Further, form being necessary to the actuality
of a thing, it is natural to think and speak of things as "forms," although they
involve matter. It is owing to this importance of form that Aristotle comes to
speak of form or essence, instead of the individual, as substance(11). The forms of
absolute, or infinite, substances necessarily imply the existence of the
actuality of those substances.
Kinds of Real Substance: Immovable Substance, God
substance is, we have seen, of two (three) kinds: substance as individual, as
species, and as genus, the first-named being primary, the others secondary,
substance. Ontologically speaking, substance is of two (three) kinds: sensible
substances, of which one part is mere body and subject to decay, and the other
is soul and eternal ; and super-sensible, "immovable substance"(12). Of the existence of sensible substance we need no proof;
the existence of the immovable substance is proved partly, as we have seen(13), from the very idea of demonstration, and partly, from the known nature of
sensible substances. These substances change and pass out of being ceaselessly
and forever. The causes of sensible beings as sensible, are other sensible
beings, and the causes of these are also other sensible beings and so on in
infinitum. No such being, or substance, has in itself the principle of change, or
motion: they move or change, produce motion, or change, only as moved or
changed by some other being. We must, then, look for an original source, or
cause, of motion, or change, which must lie in that which produces change, or
motion, without itself being subject to these. This, then, must be the immovable
substance. It exists purely as energy and as actuality, and hence is separate
from the world of change, or motion(14). If it is asked how the immovable substance
causes change, or motion, the reply must be that it does so as a thing that is
known and desired, i.e., as a thing that is loved, does. It is the source of
order in the world, as the general is
of order in the army. From it is "suspended the whole Heavens". The life of
the Prime Mover is excellent and blessed. That perception and that enjoyment
are the most excellent which are of that which is most excellent. It is
characteristic of the human mind to find its highest satisfaction in the
contemplation of itself, the most excellent of the things it has power
immediately to know: much more so is it of the Divine Mind, and the life of the
Divine Being is therefore, a life of blessed self-contemplation. God is just the
"energy," i.e., the activity and complete realization, of the ideal essence of
mind, —he is the Thought of Thought. His life is eternally what our life is
only for short periods of time. God is the highest substance, the individual
that is (in form and efficiency at least) also universal : the absolute and
eternal, alone of all things sufficient unto himself. He is the absolute Good, the supreme ideal end of all things else.
(1) Metaphysics, Bks. III and IV.
(2) For a different view, see Metaphysics, Bk. VII. ch. 7.
(3) Metaphysics, Bk. I. ch. 9; Bk. VI. chs. 14, 15, 16.
Posterior Analytics, Bk. I. chs. 11, 8, etc. (See Wallace's
Outlines, and Ueberweg.)
(4) Metaphysics, Bk. V. ch. 2.
(5) Ibid., Bk. VIII. ch. 6.
(6) Metaphysics, Bk. VIII. ch. 8.
(7) Ibid., Bk. VI. ch. 7; Bk. I. ch. 3.
(8) Metaphysics, Bk. II. ch. 2.
(9) Ibid., Bk. VII. ch. 4.
(10) Metaphysics, Bk. VIII. ch. 6.
(11) Ibid., Bk. VII. ch. 7. See above, p. 126.
(12) Metaphysics, Bk. XI. ch. I.
(13) See p. 130.
(14) Metaphysics, Bk. XI. chs. 6, 8.